People recognise when they are really anonymous in an economic game
People recognise when they are really anonymous in an economic game
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DOI：
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.02.002
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发表时间：
2010-07-01
影响因子：
5.1
通讯作者：
Mace, Ruth
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lamba, Shakti;Mace, Ruth
越来越多的证据表明，被观察的线索可以提高合作行为的问题存在的“匿名”，一次性，非亲属指导的合作和有效性使用“匿名”的经济游戏，以经验衡量这种行为在人类。在这里，我们调查人们对这种暗示效应的敏感程度。我们测试了玩最后通牒游戏的人是否可以使用关于实验匿名性的明确信息来覆盖在公共环境中同时面对两者时的暗示的任何影响。我们的研究的目的是调查是否，（1）个人在公共环境中对实验强加的匿名性做出反应，（2）已知他人的存在会影响合作行为，而不仅仅是他人的存在。我们发现，提议者的提议并没有随着上下文的变化而变化（即，没有"眼睛效应"），但确实随着实际匿名程度和已知他人的具体存在而变化。因此，我们推断，人们认识到，当他们的决定是匿名或不和提议者响应声誉的关注时，他们不是匿名的。应答者的行为并不随环境、实际匿名程度或已知他人的具体存在而变化。因此，响应者不响应声誉的关注，并使用一个统一的策略，也许只要回报结构保持不变。后一个发现可能暗示了选择有利于在某些环境中统一确保资源分配接近平等的策略，从而表现为人口中的强公平规范。(C)2010年爱思唯尔公司All rights reserved.
Mounting evidence that cues of being watched can enhance cooperative behaviour questions the existence of 'anonymous', one-shot, non-kin directed cooperation and the validity of using 'anonymous' economic games to empirically measure such behaviour in humans. Here we investigate how sensitive people are to such cuing effects. We test whether people playing an ultimatum game can use explicit information about experimental anonymity to override any effects of cuing in a public context, when faced with both simultaneously. The aims of our study were to investigate whether, (1) individuals respond to experimentally imposed anonymity within a public context and (2) the presence of known others affects cooperative behaviour over and above merely the presence of others. We find that proposer offers did not vary with changes in context (i.e., there was no "eyes effect") but did vary with the degree of actual anonymity and the specific presence of known others. Hence, we infer that people recognise when their decisions are anonymous or not and proposers respond to reputation concerns when they are not anonymous. Responder behaviour did not vary with changes in context, degree of actual anonymity or the specific presence of known others. Hence, responders do not respond to reputation concerns and use one uniform strategy, perhaps as long as the payoff structure remains constant. This latter finding may hint at selection in favour of strategies that uniformly ensure near-equal splits of resources in some environments, and thus manifest as strong fairness norms in a population. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.