Experimental Success and the Revelation of Reality: The Miracle Argument for Scientific Realism
Experimental Success and the Revelation of Reality: The Miracle Argument for Scientific Realism
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实验的成功和现实的揭示：科学实在论的奇迹论证
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-662-08129-7_6
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发表时间：
2004
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
M. Carrier
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Carrier
本文论述了支持科学实在论的所谓奇迹论证，并考察了科学实在论作为科学成功的解释的可行性。科学实在论致力于这样的主张，即成熟科学中的理论术语通常指的是真实的对象，并且这些科学中的理论定律通常近似真实。工具主义或非实在论所依据的原则是，事实主张需要经验证实，经验无法挑出真正的假设。奇迹论证说，如果一个理论涉及虚构的对象，它能够正确地预测可观察到的效应将是奇迹。这一论证把科学实在论转化为一个可以被科学史检验的假说。我进行了这样的测试，并得出结论，唯一一种似乎与历史记录一致的现实主义是“自然种类的现实主义”。那些在解释上取得显著成功的理论，真实地建立了现象之间的等价关系。
The paper addresses the so-called miracle argument in favor of scientific realism and examines the viability of scientific realism as an explanation for the success of science. Scientific realism is committed to the claims that the theoretical terms in the mature sciences typically refer to real objects and that the theoretical laws in such sciences are typically approximately true. Instrumentalism or non-realism draws on the principles that factual claims need to be confirmed empirically and that experience fails to single out true assumptions. The miracle argument says that if a theory referred to fictitious objects, it would be miraculous that it is able to correctly predict observable effects. This argument transforms scientific realism into a hypothesis that is testable by the history of science. I perform such tests and conclude that the only type of realism that appears to be in agreement with the historical record is “realism of natural kinds.” Theories that enjoy distinguished explanatory success truthfully establish equivalence relations among phenomena.