The Ruptures of American Capital: Women of Color Feminism and the Culture of Immigrant Labor
The Ruptures of American Capital: Women of Color Feminism and the Culture of Immigrant Labor
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美国资本的破裂：有色人种女性女权主义和移民劳工文化
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发表时间：
2015
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通讯作者：
Kelly E. Happe
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作者：
Kelly E. Happe
存在可以先于本质，他耸耸肩，对个人可以站在话语之外的想法不屑一顾。福柯反复强调，个性是权力、知识和话语的产物;他在《规训与惩罚》中写道，灵魂是身体的监狱。因此，他后来关于自我关怀的著作提出了一个问题：福柯改变了他的论调吗？最后，他是否渴望一种超越话语、监督、纪律和生物权力的主体性形式？他是否最终肯定了他曾经嘲笑为精神错乱的真实性？杰弗里·尼隆（Jeffrey Nealon）认为，将福柯解读为真实性政治的支持者，就是将他转变为新自由主义的傀儡，只是另一个推销产品和思想的小贩，这些产品和思想促进虚假真实性的实现，但却不影响当代权力结构。在《超越福柯》一书中，尼隆认为福柯关于自我关怀的著作并不是他早期研究议程的转移，而是他早期对生物政治学的关注的深化。阅读福柯与当代马克思主义理论，尼伦采取了个人的方程，重点是基层动员的力量，对现状。埃里克·帕拉斯在他的《福柯2.0》一书中提出了相反的观点。正如他的书名所表明的那样，帕拉斯认为，福柯最终否定了他早期的许多旨在使“人”和“个人”概念过时的工作（正如他在《事物的秩序》中所指出的那样）。帕拉斯认为，福柯迷恋上了自由主义，并试图肯定一种个性形式，这种形式为权力所及之外的真实性创造了空间，同时仍然忠于20世纪自下而上的、循环的权力现实。简而言之，他试图从内部重新构想自由主义。我倾向于根据海德格尔的人文主义而不是新自由主义来思考福柯转向主体性，但这并不重要：尽管尼阿隆有力地论证了他的立场，但帕拉斯比尼阿隆（他甚至没有引用福柯的最后一次演讲）收集了更多的证据。福柯在生命的最后阶段的游戏是什么：否定还是强化？这个问题事关重大，也是我们修辞学学者必须努力解决的问题，因为它触及话语和主观性的最基本问题，要求我们认真思考作为学者和教师的我们在做什么。在未来的几年里，我希望与其他修辞学学者一起讨论自我关怀。我们可能会问的一些问题包括：在我们这个高度中介化、政治分裂的后现代社会中，对自我的关怀会是什么样子？这个社会教人们把自己想象成消费者，而不是公民。我们怎样才能教育公民更好地反思他们是如何使用语言的，以及语言是如何被使用的？最后，当代的“精神实践”是什么样子的，如何将它们导向促进更好形式的民主参与和道德意识？
existence could come before essence, and he brushed off with a shrug the very idea that individuals could ever stand outside of discourse. Individuality, Foucault argued repeatedly and emphatically, was a product of power, knowledge, and discourse; the soul, he wrote in Discipline and Punish, was the prison of the body. His later work on the care of the self therefore raises a question: did Foucault change his tune? In the end, did he pine for a form of subjectivity outside of the reach of discourse, surveillance, discipline, and biopower? Did he end up affirming the very authenticity that he once derided as lunacy? According to Jeffrey Nealon, to read Foucault as a proponent of a politics of authenticity is to transform him into a neoliberal stooge, just another peddler of products and ideas that promote the fulfillment of a false authenticity but leave contemporary structures of power intact. In Foucault Beyond Foucault, Nealon contends that Foucault’s writings on the care of the self are not a diversion from his earlier research agenda but instead an intensification of his earlier concern with biopolitics. Reading Foucault alongside contemporary Marxist theory, Nealon takes the individual out of the equation to focus on the power of grassroots mobilization against the status quo. Eric Paras, in his book Foucault 2.0, argues the contrary. As indicated by his book’s title, Paras contends that in the end Foucault repudiated much of his earlier work that aimed to make the concept of “man” and “the individual” obsolete (as he argued notoriously in The Order of Things). Foucault became enamored with liberalism, Paras argues, and sought to affirm a form of individuality that created space for an authenticity outside of power’s reach while still being true to the bottom-up, circulating reality of power in the twentieth-century. He sought, in short, to reimagine liberalism from within. I tend to think of Foucault’s turn to subjectivity more in light of Heidegger’s humanism than neoliberalism, but no matter: although Nealon forcefully argues his position, Paras marshals much more evidence than Nealon (who does not even cite Foucault’s last lectures). What was Foucault’s game at the end of his life: repudiation or intensification? The stakes of this question are high, and it is one with which we rhetorical scholars must grapple, for it touches on the most basic matters of discourse and subjectivity and asks us to seriously consider what we are up to as scholars and teachers. In the coming years, I hope to engage with other rhetorical scholars in conversations about the care of the self. Some of the questions that we might ask include: What might the care of the self look like today, in our hyper-mediated, politically divided, postmodern society, which teaches people to imagine themselves less as citizens and more as consumers? How can we teach citizens to be more reflective about how they use—and are used by—language? What, finally, would contemporary “spiritual practices” look like, and how could they be oriented to promoting better forms of democratic engagement and ethical awareness?