On the regulation of social norms
On the regulation of social norms
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论社会规范的规制
DOI：
10.1093/jleo/17.2.449
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发表时间：
2001
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Dorothea Kübler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dorothea Kübler
开发了一个模型来理解规范如何受到“规范企业家”（例如立法者、政府机构、工会等）的影响。分析了影响规范遵循行为动态的两种工具，即改变（金钱）激励和改变遵循规范的含义或声誉价值。这两种形式的规范规制都被纳入阿克洛夫的社会习惯模型（1980）中，并导出了不同类型规范的规范破坏和规范创造的比较静态属性。特别是，它展示了当几乎每个人都遵循规范并且当它们采取跟风和势利规范的形式时，应该如何规范规范。版权所有 2001，牛津大学出版社。
A model is developed to understand how norms can be influenced by "norm entrepreneurs," for example, lawmakers, government agencies, unions, etc. Two instruments of influencing the dynamics of norm-following behavior are analyzed, namely transforming the (monetary) incentives and changing the meaning or the reputational value of following a norm. Both forms of norm regulation are incorporated into Akerlof's model of social custom (1980), and the comparative static properties of norm destruction and norm creation for different types of norms are derived. In particular, it is shown how norms should be regulated when almost everybody follows them and when they take the form of bandwagon and snob norms. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.