Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed
Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed
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从监督中学习：重建火灾警报和警察巡逻
DOI：
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Mathew D. McCubbins
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Lupia;Mathew D. McCubbins
虽然决策权从立法者向官僚的授权在现代民主国家中是普遍存在的，但对于这种授权的后果却存在相当大的分歧。一些学者指出，官僚往往拥有与政策相关的专业知识，并假设官僚会利用他们的专业知识系统性地误导立法者，并得出授权和退位是等价的结论。其他学者指出立法监督的广泛使用，认为监督足以减轻与官僚专业知识相关的问题，并得出结论认为授权可以产生更有效的治理。我们与以前的学术不同，开发了授权和监督模型，使我们能够得出而不是假设立法者能够成功适应官僚专业知识的条件。有了这些条件，我们就可以确定在什么条件下向官僚机构授权可以产生更有效的治理，以及在什么条件下授权和放弃是等效的。版权所有 1994，牛津大学出版社。
While the delegation of policy-making authority from legislators to bureaucrats is ubiquitous in modern democracies, there is considerable disagreement about the consequences of this type of delegation. Some scholars point to the fact that bureaucrats tend to have policy-relevant expertise, assume that bureaucrats will use their expertise to systematically mislead legislators, and conclude that delegation and abdication are equivalent. Other scholars point to the extensive use of legislative oversight, assume that oversight is sufficient to abate the problems associated with bureaucratic expertise, and conclude that delegation produces more effective governance. We depart from previous scholarship by developing models of delegation and oversight that allow us to derive, rather than assume, conditions under which legislators can adapt successfully to bureaucratic expertise. With these conditions in hand, we identify conditions under which delegation to the bureaucracy produces more effective governance and conditions under which delegation and abdication are equivalent. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.