Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments
Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments
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信息不对称和立法规则：一些修正案
DOI：
10.1017/s0003055401002192
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发表时间：
2001
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Vijay B. Krishna
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Vijay B. Krishna
我们重新审视立法规则信息论的主要原则，重点关注具有不同限制程度的规则的信息效率。当委员会具有异质性时，在无限制的开放规则以及稍微限制性的修改规则下可以实现充分的效率。相反，限制性的封闭规则总是会导致效率低下。当委员会同质化时，情况就不同了。无论立法规则如何，所有均衡都是低效的，但封闭规则比开放规则带来更高的信息效率。此外，无论偏好分歧程度如何，封闭规则下的效率增益都足以抵消分配损失。我们还研究了信息获取和委员会专业化的不同规则所提供的激励措施。
We reexamine the major tenets of the informational theory of legislative rules, focusing on the informational efficiency of rules with varying degrees of restrictiveness. When committees are heterogeneous, full efficiency is attainable under the unrestrictive open rule as well as the somewhat restrictive modified rule. In contrast, the restrictive closed rule always leads to inefficiencies. When committees are homogeneous, the situation is different. All equilibria are inefficient regardless of legislative rules, but the closed rule leads to greater informational efficiency than does the open rule. Furthermore, the efficiency gains under the closed rule more than offset distributional losses regardless of the degree of preference divergence. We also examine the incentives provided by the different rules for information acquisition and committee specialization.