Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units
Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units
复制标题
多个单位提供的排他性公共物品的系列成本分摊
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-007-0219-2
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Yan Yu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yan Yu
本文描述了可在多个单元中使用的可排他性公共物品的成本分摊的系列机制。我们发现，串行机制是唯一的自愿机制，满足联盟的战略防御和消费者主权。
This paper characterizes serial mechanisms for the cost sharing of an excludable public good that is available in multiple units. We show that serial mechanisms are the only voluntary mechanisms that satisfy coalition strategy-proofness and consumer sovereignty.