Oscillatory dynamics in evolutionary games are suppressed by heterogeneous adaptation rates of players
Oscillatory dynamics in evolutionary games are suppressed by heterogeneous adaptation rates of players
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.11.010
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发表时间：
2008-03-07
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Masuda, Naoki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Masuda, Naoki
以石头剪刀布博弈为代表的三个或三个以上的策略循环竞争的博弈动态引起了理论和实践的兴趣。在进化动力学中，循环竞争导致个体策略者密度的振荡动力学。在有限规模的种群中，如果没有突变，振荡会爆炸，直到除了一个策略之外的所有策略都被根除。在本文中，我们正式的复制动力学的球员谁有不同的适应率。我们分析和数值计算表明，异质适应率抑制振荡幅度。在具有循环竞争策略和同质适应率的社会困境博弈中，利他策略往往相对较弱，无法在有限规模的种群中生存。在这种情况下，异质的适应率保存不同的策略共存，从而促进利他主义。当一种策略在没有循环竞争的情况下支配其他策略时，快速适应者比缓慢适应者赚得更多。如果不是，快速和缓慢的适应者的混合稳定人口动态，缓慢的适应并不意味着效率低下的球员。(c)2007爱思唯尔有限公司版权所有。
Game dynamics in which three or more strategies are cyclically competitive, as represented by the rock-scissors-paper game, have attracted practical and theoretical interests. In evolutionary dynamics, cyclic competition results in oscillatory dynamics of densities of individual strategists. In finite-size populations, it is known that oscillations blow up until all but one strategies are eradicated if without mutation. In the present paper, we formalize replicator dynamics with players who have different adaptation rates. We show analytically and numerically that the heterogeneous adaptation rate suppresses the oscillation amplitude. In social dilemma games with cyclically competing strategies and homogeneous adaptation rates, altruistic strategies are often relatively weak and cannot survive in finite-size populations. In such situations, heterogeneous adaptation rates save coexistence of different strategies and hence promote altruism. When one strategy dominates the others without cyclic competition, fast adaptors earn more than slow adaptors. When not, mixture of fast and slow adaptors stabilizes population dynamics, and slow adaptation does not imply inefficiency for a player. (c) 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.