Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
复制标题
具有不可分割利益的经济体的战略证明分配机制
DOI：
10.1007/s003550050134
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发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Shinji Ohseto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Shinji Ohseto
摘要。我们认为经济只有单一的不可分割的商品和货币。我们描述了满足策略证明性、个体合理性、等额补偿和需求单调性的一组机制。有三种类型的机制具有以下性质：(i)它们决定货币补偿的分配，这取决于谁获得了不可分割的物品；（ii）将不可分割货物分配予预先指定的（一个或两个）代理人之一；（iii）他们无视预先指定的代理人以外的代理人的偏好。这一结果表明，不可分好的存在导致了机制的严重不对称性。
Abstract. We consider economies with a single indivisible good and money. We characterize the set of mechanisms that satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, equal compensation, and demand monotonicity. There are three types of mechanisms which have the following properties: (i) they determine the allocation of monetary compensation depending on who receives the indivisible good; (ii) they allocate the indivisible good to one of the pre-specified (one or two) agent(s); and (iii) they disregard preferences of agents other than the pre-specified agent(s). This result implies that the presence of an indivisible good induces serious asymmetry in mechanisms.