An epistemic approach to paraconsistency: a logic of evidence and truth
An epistemic approach to paraconsistency: a logic of evidence and truth
复制标题
准一致性的认知方法：证据和真理的逻辑
DOI：
10.1007/s11229-017-1621-7
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
A. Rodrigues
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Carnielli;A. Rodrigues
本文的目的是提出一个次协调的形式系统和相应的预期解释，根据真正的矛盾是不容忍的。相反，矛盾在认识上被理解为相互冲突的证据，其中命题A的证据被理解为相信A为真的理由。本文定义了一个次协调、次完全的自然演绎系统，称为基本证据逻辑（BLE），并将其推广为证据真逻辑（）。后者是一个逻辑的形式不一致性和不确定性，是能够表达不仅保存证据，但也保存反dialetheist的意义上说，根据这里提出的直观解释，其后果关系是微不足道的存在任何真正的矛盾。truth.is适当的语义和决策方法提出了bothBLEand，以及一些技术成果，适合预期的解释。
The purpose of this paper is to present a paraconsistent formal system and a corresponding intended interpretation according to which true contradictions are not tolerated. Contradictions are, instead, epistemically understood as conflicting evidence, where evidence for a propositionAis understood as reasons for believing thatAis true. The paper defines a paraconsistent and paracomplete natural deduction system, called theBasic Logic of Evidence(BLE), and extends it to theLogic of Evidence and Truth(). The latter is a logic of formal inconsistency and undeterminedness that is able to express not only preservation of evidence but also preservation of truth.is anti-dialetheist in the sense that, according to the intuitive interpretation proposed here, its consequence relation is trivial in the presence of any true contradiction. Adequate semantics and a decision method are presented for bothBLEand, as well as some technical results that fit the intended interpretation.