Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud
Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2571980
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发表时间：
2015-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
L. Haß;Maximilian A. Müller;Skrålan Vergauwe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
L. Haß;Maximilian A. Müller;Skrålan Vergauwe
本文从CEO晋升锦标赛的相对绩效评价特征中发现了一种新的激励经理人参与公司欺诈的动机。我们记录了具有强烈锦标赛激励的公司（如CEO薪酬差距所代表的）更高的欺诈倾向。我们认为，CEO晋升锦标赛的相对业绩评价特征会产生操纵业绩的激励，而类似期权的特征会激励管理者从事风险活动。因此，我们扩展以前的公司欺诈文献，主要集中在股权激励和报告混合的结果。我们的研究结果是强大的，使用不同的欺诈样本，并控制其他已知的欺诈决定因素以及管理人员的技能。
This paper identifies a new incentive for managers to engage in corporate fraud stemming from the relative performance evaluation feature of CEO promotion tournaments. We document higher propensities to engage in fraud for firms with strong tournament incentives (as proxied for by the CEO pay gap). We posit that the relative performance evaluation feature of CEO promotion tournaments creates incentives to manipulate performance, while the option-like character can motivate managers to engage in risky activities. We thereby extend previous corporate fraud literature that focuses mainly on equity-based incentives and reports mixed findings. Our results are robust to using different fraud samples, and controlling for other known determinants of fraud as well as manager skills.