Competition in secondary spectrum markets: Price war or market sharing?
Competition in secondary spectrum markets: Price war or market sharing?
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二级频谱市场的竞争：价格战还是市场份额？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Starobinski
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Emir Kavurmacioglu;M. Alanyali;D. Starobinski
近期的举措允许移动运营商提供其授权频谱的即时服务，为动态的二级频谱市场铺平了道路。本文描述了当多个运营商参与二级需求竞争时的市场结果。我们研究了一个博弈论模型，其中每个运营商旨在通过机会性地满足二级需求同时也满足专用的一级需求来增加其收入。二级需求是收费价格的函数。我们考虑了在一级需求和二级需求之间共享频谱的两种理念：在协调接入中，如果有助于增加收入，频谱运营商可以选择拒绝二级接入请求。我们明确地描述了一个收支平衡价格，使得如果二级接入定价高于收支平衡价格，无论二级需求的数量如何，都能保证二级接入服务的盈利性。因此，我们确定采用协调接入的运营商之间的竞争会导致价格战。特别是，高于收支平衡价格的市场共享不是一个均衡结果。这一结论对于任意的二级需求函数都是有效的。虽然需求函数在确定赢家方面不起作用，但它确实会影响获胜运营商所执行的二级接入价格。在非协调接入中，一级用户和二级用户在平等的基础上共享频谱，类似于ISM频段的共享模式。我们证明，非协调接入环境中的市场均衡可能会有根本的不同，因为它开启了运营商以更高价格共享市场的可能性。
Recent initiatives allow cellular providers to offer spot service of their licensed spectrum, paving the way to dynamic secondary spectrum markets. This paper characterizes market outcomes when multiple providers are drawn into competition for secondary demand. We study a game-theoretic model in which each provider aims to enhance its revenue by opportunistically serving secondary demand, while also serving dedicated primary demand. The secondary demand is a function of the price being charged. We consider two philosophies for sharing spectrum between primary and secondary demand: In coordinated access, spectrum providers have the option to decline a secondary access request if that helps enhance their revenue. We explicitly characterize a break-even price such that profitability of secondary access provision is guaranteed if secondary access is priced above the break-even price, regardless of the volume of secondary demand. Consequently, we establish that competition among providers that employ coordinated access leads to a price war. In particular market sharing above the break-even price is not an equilibrium outcome. This conclusion is valid for arbitrary secondary-demand functions. While the demand function does not play a part in determining the winner, it does affect the price of secondary access as exercised by the winning provider. In uncoordinated access, primary and secondary users share spectrum on equal basis, akin to the sharing modality of ISM bands. We demonstrate that market equilibrium in an uncoordinated access setting can be fundamentally different as it opens up the possibility of providers sharing the market at higher prices.