Identity-Based Encryption with Post-Challenge Auxiliary Inputs for Secure Cloud Applications and Sensor Networks
Identity-Based Encryption with Post-Challenge Auxiliary Inputs for Secure Cloud Applications and Sensor Networks
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-319-11203-9_8
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发表时间：
2014-09
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Tsz Hon Yuen;Ye Zhang;S. Yiu;Joseph K. Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tsz Hon Yuen;Ye Zhang;S. Yiu;Joseph K. Liu
基于身份的加密（IBE）在云应用和无线传感器网络等许多场景中用于提供端到端的访问控制和数据保护，但是，对加密原始数据的数据所有者或传感器以及解密密文并恢复原始数据的数据用户或控制中心存在一些实际威胁。在本文中，我们解决了开放的问题，提出了一个泄漏弹性加密模型，可以捕获泄漏的秘密密钥所有者（数据用户或控制中心）和泄漏（数据所有者或传感器），在辅助输入模型。现有的模型只允许密钥的泄漏，不允许攻击者在看到安全游戏的挑战密文后查询更多的泄漏信息。我们通过定义挑战后辅助输入模型来解决这个问题，在该模型中，必须在对手获得公钥之前定义泄漏函数族。挑战后查询将返回加密器使用的加密随机性的泄漏。该模型能够捕获更广泛的现实世界攻击。为了实现我们的模型，我们提出了一个通用的转换，从辅助输入模型到我们新的挑战后辅助输入模型的公钥加密（PKE）和IBE。此外，我们扩展Canetti等人。的技术，该技术将CPA安全的IBE转换为CCA安全的PKE。© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland.
Identity-based encryption (IBE) is useful for providing end-to-end access control and data protection in many scenarios such as cloud applications and wireless sensor networks However, there are some practical threats for the data owner or the sensor, who encrypts raw data; and the data user or the control centre, who decrypts the ciphertext and recovers the raw data. In this paper, we tackle the open problem of proposing a leakage-resilience encryption model that can capture leakage from both the secret key owner (the data user or control centre) and the encryptor (the data owner or sensor), in the auxiliary input model. Existing models only allow the leakage of the secret key and do not allow adversaries to query more leakage information after seeing the challenge ciphertext of the security games. We solve this problem by defining the post-challenge auxiliary input model in which the family of leakage functions must be defined before the adversary is given the public key. The post-challenge query will return the leakage of the encryption randomness used by the encryptor. This model is able to capture a wider class of real-world attacks. To realize our model, we propose a generic transformation from the auxiliary input model to our new post-challenge auxiliary input model for both public key encryption (PKE) and IBE. Furthermore, we extend Canetti et al.'s technique, that converts CPA-secure IBE to CCA-secure PKE, into the leakage-resilient setting. © 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland.