Market failure fallacies and accounting information
Market failure fallacies and accounting information
复制标题
市场失灵谬误和会计信息
DOI：
10.1016/0165-4101(80)90002-6
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发表时间：
1980
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Leftwich
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Leftwich
加强会计监管的支持者认为，会计信息的私人市场存在缺陷。本文认为市场失灵理论存在逻辑谬误。这些理论中确定的最优值并不是最优值，因为它们是独立于实现它们所必需的制度安排而定义的。现有的制度安排，如市场，不应该被谴责，直到它可以表明，有一个替代制度，可以产生社会上级output.The本文研究的理论，明确声称，有失败的私人市场的会计信息。此外，早期对会计信息的批评从经济学的角度被重述，这些批评隐含地假设私人生产的会计信息受到市场失灵的影响。本文最后建议，如果会计研究是有助于公共政策的制定，研究人员应该把重点放在评估的类型的信息，可以产生的可行的制度，如市场或政府机构。
Proponents of increased regulation of accounting maintain that there are failures in the private market for accounting information. In this paper, it is argued that market failure theories contain a logical fallacy. The optima identified in those theories are not optima because they are defined independently of institutional arrangements necessary to attain them. Existing institutional arrangements, such as markets, should not be condemned until it can be shown that there is an alternative regime which can produce socially superior output.The paper examines theories which explicitly allege that there are failures in the private market for accounting information. In addition, early criticisms of accounting information are restated in economic terms, and it is revealed that those criticisms implicitly assume that private production of accounting information suffers from market failures. The paper concludes by suggesting that, if accounting research is to contribute to public policy formulation, researchers should focus on evaluating the type of information that can be produced by feasible regimes such as markets or government agencies.