Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation

Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation
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DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3471491
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发表时间:
2019
期刊:
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Mofei Zhao
Mofei Zhao
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Fei Li;Yangbo Song;Mofei Zhao

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我们在制度变化的背景下研究信息设计。连续的代理人独立选择是否攻击当前政权,并且当且仅当攻击者的数量超过政权的力量时才会成功。强度是不确定的,信息设计者选择强度依赖实验来维持现状。最优的信息结构在主体之间的部分真实和局部夸大之间随机化:一些主体接收到与现状真实强度相匹配的信号,而另一些主体接收到声称强度略高的升高信号。最优局部模糊严格控制公共信号,在公共信号无效的某些情况下,局部模糊仍然保证了现状的生存。
We study information design in a regime change context. A continuum of agents choose independently whether to attack the current regime and will succeed if and only if the mass of attackers outweighs the regime's strength. The strength is uncertain, and the information designer chooses a strength-dependent experiment to maintain the status quo. The optimal information structure randomizes between partial truth-telling and local exaggeration across agents: some agents receive a signal matching the true strength of the status quo, and others receive an elevated signal professing slightly higher strength. Optimal local obfuscation strictly dominates public signals, and in certain cases where public signals become futile, local obfuscation still guarantees the status quo's survival.