Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
复制标题
委员会的序数贝叶斯激励兼容表示
DOI：
10.1007/bf00433655
复制
发表时间：
1988
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
B. Peleg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. d'Aspremont;B. Peleg
我们考虑的问题，战略操纵的决策方案，提供了一个足够的代表性（在某种意义上）的权力分配在一个委员会。“不受策略影响的代表”是非常严格的：它意味着委员会只包含一个最小的获胜联盟。因此，我们引入了“序贯贝叶斯激励相容表示”的概念，并在一定条件下证明了弱对策的序贯贝叶斯激励相容表示的存在性。最后，构建的例子，我们首先展示了如何必要的这些条件，包括使用的机会在投票过程中，第二，我们不能避免孔多塞悖论。
We consider the problem of strategic manipulation for decision schemes that provide an adequate representation (in some sense) of the distribution of power within a committee. “Strategy-proof representation” is very restrictive: it implies that the committee contains exactly one minimal winning coalition. So we introduce the weaker concept of “Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible representation” and prove the existence of such representations for weak games under some conditions. Finally, constructing examples, we show first how necessary these conditions are—including the use of chance in the voting procedure — and second that we cannot avoid Condorcet's paradox.