Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis
Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis
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工作歧视、市场力量和隐形假说
DOI：
10.2307/1884213
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发表时间：
1987
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Oster
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Paul R. Milgrom;S. Oster
隐形假说认为，弱势工人的工作技能不容易被潜在的新雇主发现，但晋升提高了可见性，缓解了这一问题。然后，在竞争性劳动力市场均衡中，企业通过将有才能的弱势工人隐藏在低水平的工作岗位上来获利。因此，这些工人的平均工资低于同等教育水平和能力的其他人，升职的机会也更少。由于低效率和歧视性的工资和晋升政策，处境不利的工人在人力资本投资方面的回报低于其他工人。
The Invisibility Hypothesis holds that the job skills of disadvantaged workers are not easily discovered by potential new employers, but that promotion enhances visibility and alleviates this problem. Then, at a competitive labor market equilibrium, firms profit by hiding talented disadvantaged workers in low level jobs. Consequently, those workers are paid less on average and promoted less often than others with the same education and ability. As a result of the inefficient and discriminatory wage and promotion policies, disadvantaged workers experience lower returns to investments in human capital than other workers.