English Bacon: Copartisan Bias in Intergovernmental Grant Allocation in England
English Bacon: Copartisan Bias in Intergovernmental Grant Allocation in England
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英国培根：英国政府间拨款分配中的党派偏见
作者：
Alexander Fouirnaies;Hande Mutlu
有关分配政治的文献表明，政治家有动机参与有针对性的支出，特别是在权力下放的政治体系中，政党力量薄弱，选举以候选人为中心。我们认为，在以政党为中心的选举集中的政治制度中，政党使用政府间转移支付，以提高他们的选举财富，通过绩效溢出在不同级别的政府。在英格兰地方议会的党派组成和中央政府在1992-2012年期间分配的赠款的一个新的数据集的基础上，并使用差异中的差异的方法，我们提供的证据表明，政府分配高达17%以上的钱给地方议会控制他们的“自己”党。此外，我们表明，效果是最强的接近地方选举年，在地方议会机构促进信贷索赔，并在摇摆议会。
The literature on distributive politics suggests that politicians have incentives to engage in targeted spending especially in decentralized political systems with weak parties and candidate-centered elections. We argue that in centralized political systems with party-centered elections parties use intergovernmental transfers to advance their electoral fortune via performance spillovers across different levels of government. On the basis of a new data set on partisan composition of local councils in England and grants allocated by the central government during 1992–2012, and using a difference-in-difference approach, we provide evidence that governments allocate up to 17% more money to local councils controlled by their “own” party. Furthermore, we show that the effect is strongest closer to local election years, in local councils where institutions facilitate credit claiming, and in swing councils.