Mass Administrative Reorganization, Media Attention, and the Paradox of Information
Mass Administrative Reorganization, Media Attention, and the Paradox of Information
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DOI：
10.1111/puar.12396
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发表时间：
2015-11-01
影响因子：
8.3
通讯作者：
Sinclair, J. Andrew
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bertelli, Anthony M.;Sinclair, J. Andrew
媒体的关注如何影响政府关于是否终止独立行政机构的决定？作者认为，一个机构在党派受众中的突出地位会产生直接影响，但媒体的高调会扰乱正常的政府监督程序，并模糊终止决定。这一论点的背景下，最近大规模的行政重组，英国联合政府使用概率和异方差概率回归模型进行评估。有证据表明，终止是不太可能的机构突出的报纸流行的政府的核心支持者，但不是那些阅读的少数联盟伙伴。我们还发现，具有更大的整体报纸的显着性，以及年轻的机构机构有较高的误差方差。
How does media attention influence government decisions about whether to terminate independent administrative agencies? The authors argue that an agency's salience with partisan audiences has a direct effect, but a high media profile can disrupt normal government monitoring processes and obfuscate termination decisions. This argument is evaluated in the context of a recent mass administrative reorganization by the British coalition government using probit and heteroscedastic probit regression models. The evidence suggests that termination is less likely for agencies salient in newspapers popular with the government's core supporters but not those read by its minority coalition partner. We also find that agencies with greater overall newspaper salience as well as younger agencies have a higher error variance.