Improving a supplier's quantity discount gain from many different buyers
Improving a supplier's quantity discount gain from many different buyers
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DOI：
10.1080/07408170008967462
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发表时间：
2000-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Qinan Wang;Zhang Wu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Qinan Wang;Zhang Wu
我们考虑供应商的定价和库存决策，供应商提供一个单一的产品，多个异构的买家。该问题被分析为一个Stackelberg博弈，在该博弈中，供应商作为领导者，提前向所有的采购商宣布其定价策略，而采购商作为追随者，在供应商的定价方案下，独立地选择他们的订购量和相关的采购价格。在本文中，我们提出了一种定价策略的供应商提供价格折扣的基础上，从折扣前的买家的订单数量的百分比增加。提出的策略被定义为一个离散的所有单位数量折扣计划与许多断点。我们证明：（I）所提出的策略提供了一个更高的价格折扣，买方订购更大的数量，因此符合一般的公平贸易法;（ii）一个明确的解决方案，获得了供应商的最优决策;（iii）虽然供应商在现实中通常提供价格折扣的基础上，买方的单位增加的订单数量，所提出的政策是上级的供应商时，有许多不同的买家。建议的定价政策的其他好处是通过数值例子证明。
We consider the pricing and inventory decisions of a vendor who supplies a single product to multiple heterogeneous buyers. The problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg game in which the vendor acts as the leader by announcing its pricing policy to all the buyers in advance and the buyers act as followers by choosing their order quantity and the sassociated purchasing price independently under the vendors' pricing scheme. We propose in this paper a pricing policy for the vendor that offers price discounts based on the percentage increase from a buyers' order quantity before discount. The proposed policy is defined as a discrete all-unit quantity discount schedule with many break points. We show that: (I) the proposed policy offers a higher price discount to a buyer ordering a larger quantity and hence complies with general fair trade laws; (ii) an explicit solution is obtained for the vendors' optimal decision; and (iii) although suppliers in reality normally offer price discounts based on a buyers' unit increase in order quantity, the proposed policy is superior for the vendor when there are many different buyers. Other benefits of the proposed pricing policy are demonstrated by numerical examples.