Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection
Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection
复制标题
金融契约与投资者保护的政治经济学
DOI：
10.1257/mac.4.4.163
复制
发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
P. Ševčík
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Ševčík
本文在一个具有资本积累和职业选择的政治经济模型中研究了投资者保护与经济发展的联合动态。投资者保护的减少意味着企业家的外部融资成本更高。这将较贫穷的代理人排除在创业之外，从而增加了其余企业家的利润。投资者保护政策偏好的主要决定因素是代理人的净资产和创业的预期回报。当根据简单多数原则选择政策时，该模型产生了与观察到的投资者保护随时间和不同国家的变化相一致的几个含义。（jd72, e22, e32, g18, g38, j24, l26）
This paper studies the joint dynamics of investor protection and economic development in a political economy model with capital accumulation and occupational choice. Less investor protection implies higher costs of external financing for entrepreneurs. This excludes poorer agents from entrepreneurship, increasing the profits of the remaining entrepreneurs. The main determinants of investor protection policy preferences are the agent's net worth and the expected return from entrepreneurship. When the policy is chosen by the simple majority rule, the model generates several implications consistent with the observed variation of investor protection over time and across countries. (JEL D72, E22, E32, G18, G38, J24, L26)