An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration
An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration
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最终报价仲裁分析
DOI：
10.1177/002200278002400407
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发表时间：
1980
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
H. Farber
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Farber
建立了最终报价仲裁（FOA）过程模型，导出了最终报价的纳什均衡对。结果表明，风险厌恶程度越高的一方提出的报价越合理，被仲裁员选择的可能性越大。导出了潜在谈判解决的合同区域，其大小显示与当事人对仲裁员偏好的不确定性直接相关。然而，在不确定性增加的情况下，各方的最终报价会出现分歧，因此，在谈判确实失败时，在合同区域的大小和仲裁裁决的极限之间存在权衡。最后，研究表明，在FOA下的谈判解决方案对风险厌恶程度更高的一方不利。
A model of the final-offer arbitration (FOA) process is developed, and the Nash equilibrium pair of final offers is derived. It is shown that the more risk-averse party submits a more reasonable offer so that it has a higher probability of being chosen by the arbitrator. The contract zone of potential negotiated settlements is derived, and its size is shown to be directly related to the uncertainty of the parties concerning the arbitrators' preferences. However, the final offers of the parties diverge where there is increased uncertainty, so that there is a trade-off between the size of the contract zone and the extremity of arbitrated awards when negotiations do fail. Finally, it is shown that negotiated settlements under FOA are skewed against the more risk-averse party.