Meaning in Consequences
Meaning in Consequences
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后果的意义
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Wells
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文献类型：
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作者：
M. Wells
本文旨在代表结果主义生命意义理论对撒迪厄斯·梅茨提出的批评作出回应，并以此论证关于生命意义理论的争论可能如何取得进展。通过使用为结果主义道德理论发展起来的概念资源，我认为梅茨反对结果主义生活意义理论的一般论点是失败的。也就是说，一些结果主义理论可以容纳梅茨的批评。然而，使用在关于实践理性的结果主义理论的辩论中发展起来的概念资源，然后我展示了我们如何在结果主义和非结果主义理论之间的辩论中取得进展，以及在更广泛的生活意义的理论化方面取得进展。
This paper aims to respond on behalf of consequentialist theories of meaning in life to criticisms raised by Thaddeus Metz and, in doing so, demonstrates how the debate over theories of meaning in life might make progress. By using conceptual resources developed for consequentialist theories of morality, I argue that Metz’s general arguments against consequentialist theories of meaning in life fail. That is, some consequentialist theories can accommodate Metz’s criticisms. However, using conceptual resources developed in debate concerning consequentialist theories of practical reason, I then demonstrate how we might progress in the debate between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist theories, and in theorizing on meaning in life more generally.