A game theoretical model of deforestation in human-environment relationships
A game theoretical model of deforestation in human-environment relationships
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.01.005
复制
发表时间：
2009-05-07
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Satake, Akiko
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Rodrigues, Antonio;Koeppl, Heinz;Satake, Akiko
我们研究了一个关于人类与环境关系中森林砍伐的两人博弈。每个土地所有者管理一个单一的地块，土地使用状况是森林，农业或废弃。土地所有者有两种战略：森林保护和砍伐森林。森林砍伐的选择为土地所有者提供了高回报，但它降低了由不同土地所有者管理的相邻地块上产生的森林生态系统服务。考虑到两个土地所有者之间的空间相互作用，每个土地所有者通过比较每个策略的预期贴现效用来决定选择哪种策略。预期贴现效用乃根据两幅地块的状态转变，经考虑现时及未来将收取的效用而厘定。状态转换描述的马尔可夫链，结合了土地所有者的选择是否砍伐森林和动态的农业放弃和森林再生。通过考虑一个平稳分布的马尔可夫链的土地利用过渡，我们得到明确的条件纳什均衡。我们发现，缓慢的森林再生有利于相互合作（森林保护）。随着森林再生速度的加快，相互合作转化为双重纳什均衡（相互合作和相互背叛），最终相互背叛（森林砍伐）导致唯一的纳什均衡。两种不同类型的社会困境出现在我们的森林砍伐游戏。猎鹿困境最有可能发生在不可持续的资源供应下，森林再生极其缓慢，但农业废弃发生得相当迅速。相反，囚徒困境可能是在持续或循环的资源供应下，森林迅速再生，农业废弃发生缓慢或迅速。这些结果表明，人类和环境如何相互塑造森林经营的困境结构，这意味着解决困境取决于环境属性。(C)2009爱思唯尔有限公司保留所有权利。
We studied a two-person game regarding deforestation in human-environment relationships. Each landowner manages a single land parcel where the state of land-use is forested, agricultural, or abandoned. The landowner has two strategies available: forest conservation and deforestation. The choice of deforestation provides a high return to the landowner, but it degrades the forest ecosystem services produced on a neighboring land parcel managed by a different landowner. Given spatial interactions between the two landowners, each landowner decides which strategy to choose by comparing the expected discounted utility of each strategy. Expected discounted utility is determined by taking into account the current and future utilities to be received, according to the state transition on the two land parcels. The state transition is described by a Markov chain that incorporates a landowner's choice about whether to deforest and the dynamics of agricultural abandonment and forest regeneration. By considering a stationary distribution of the Markov chain for land-use transitions, we derive explicit conditions for Nash equilibrium. We found that a slow regeneration of forests favors mutual cooperation (forest conservation). As the forest regenerates faster, Mutual cooperation transforms to double Nash equilibria (mutual cooperation and mutual defection), and finally mutual defection (deforestation) leads to a unique Nash equilibrium. Two different types of social dilemma emerge in our deforestation game. The stag-hunt dilemma is most likely to occur under an unsustainable resource supply, where forest regenerates extremely slowly but agricultural abandonment happens quite rapidly. In contrast, the prisoner's dilemma is likely under a persistent or circulating supply of resources, where forest regenerates rapidly and agricultural abandonment occurs slowly or rapidly. These results show how humans and the environment mutually shape the dilemma Structure in forest management, implying that solutions to dilemmas depend on environmental properties. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.