A Mean Field Game Approach for Distributed Control of Thermostatic Loads Acting in Simultaneous Energy-Frequency Response Markets
A Mean Field Game Approach for Distributed Control of Thermostatic Loads Acting in Simultaneous Energy-Frequency Response Markets
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DOI：
10.1109/tsg.2019.2895247
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发表时间：
2019-01
影响因子：
9.6
通讯作者：
Antonio De Paola;V. Trovato;D. Angeli;G. Strbac
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Antonio De Paola;V. Trovato;D. Angeli;G. Strbac
本文提出了一种新颖的分布式解决方案，用于运行大量恒温控制负载 (TCL)，提供频率支持。采用博弈论框架，将 TCL 建模为价格响应理性代理，调度其能源消耗并分配频率响应供应，以最小化其运营成本。这项工作的新颖之处在于使用平均场博弈来抽象大量 TCL 与电网的复杂交互，并引入创新的市场结构，设想不同的电力价格信号和响应。与以前的方法不同，此类价格不是临时设计的，而是从底层系统调度模型导出的。
This paper proposes a novel distributed solution for the operation of large populations of thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs) providing frequency support. A game-theory framework is adopted, modeling the TCLs as price-responsive rational agents that schedule their energy consumption and allocate frequency response provision in order to minimize their operational costs. The novelty of this work lies in the use of mean field games to abstract the complex interactions of large numbers of TCLs with the grid and in the introduction of an innovative market structure, envisioning distinct price signals for electricity and response. Differently from previous approaches, such prices are not designed ad hoc but are derived instead from an underlying system scheduling model.