Efficiency in Matching Markets with Regional Caps: The Case of the Japan Residency Matching Program
Efficiency in Matching Markets with Regional Caps: The Case of the Japan Residency Matching Program
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市场与区域上限匹配的效率：日本居留权匹配计划的案例
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
F. Kojima
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yuichiro Kamada;F. Kojima
为了增加农村医院的住院医师人数，日本政府最近引入了“地区上限”，限制了每个地区的住院医师人数。政府修改了艾德延迟接受机制，纳入了区域上限。本文表明，目前的机制可能会导致不可避免的低效和不稳定，并提出了一个更好的机制，提高它的效率和稳定性，同时满足区域上限。更广泛地说，本文有助于匹配和市场设计的一般研究议程，以解决实际问题。
In an attempt to increase the placement of medical residents to rural hospitals, the Japanese government recently introduced "regional caps" which restrict the total number of residents matched within each region of the country. The government modifi ed the deferred acceptance mechanism incorporating the regional caps. This paper shows that the current mechanism may result in avoidable ineffciency and instability and proposes a better mechanism that improves upon it in terms of effciency and stability while meeting the regional caps. More broadly, the paper contributes to the general research agenda of matching and market design to address practical problems.