A Stochastic Disaster Relief Game Theory Network Model
A Stochastic Disaster Relief Game Theory Network Model
复制标题
随机救灾博弈论网络模型
DOI：
10.1007/s43069-020-0010-0
复制
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
L. Nagurney
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Nagurney;M. Salarpour;June Dong;L. Nagurney
在本文中，我们构建了一个新的博弈论模型，多个人道主义组织参与救灾。每个组织都面临着一个两阶段的随机优化问题，与采购和储存救灾物品的灾前，受预算约束，并在必要时，额外的采购和装运后的灾难。该模式将后勤和财政部分结合起来，因为人道主义组织竞相争取财政捐助和货运服务，每个组织都力求最大限度地发挥其预期效用。每个人道主义组织的预期效用函数取决于其战略和其他组织的战略，它们的可行集也取决于这些战略，因为这些组织受到共同的需求下限和上限约束。管理的概念是一个随机的广义纳什均衡。我们提供了替代变分不等式公式的模型，并提出了一种算法方案，在每次迭代产生封闭形式的产品购买/存储/运输变量和相关的约束拉格朗日乘数的表达式。数值例子说明了建模和计算框架。
In this paper, we construct a novel game theory model for multiple humanitarian organizations engaged in disaster relief. Each organization is faced with a two-stage stochastic optimization problem associated with the purchase and storage of relief items pre-disaster, subject to a budget constraint, and, if need be, additional purchases and shipments post the disaster. The model integrates logistical and financial components, in that the humanitarian organizations compete for financial donations, as well as freight service provision, and each seeks to maximize its expected utility. The expected utility function of each humanitarian organization depends on its strategies and on those of the other organizations, and their feasible sets do, as well, since the organizations are subject to common lower and upper bound demand constraints. The governing concept is that of a stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium. We provide alternative variational inequality formulations of the model and propose an algorithmic scheme, which at each iteration yields closed form expressions for the product purchase/storage/shipment variables and the associated constraint Lagrange multipliers. Numerical examples illustrate the modeling and computational framework.