Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition with unemployment
Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition with unemployment
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DOI：
10.1111/jpet.12684
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发表时间：
2024-02-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Tamai，Toshiki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kikuchi，Yuya;Tamai，Toshiki
本研究探讨两种不同的财政竞争博弈下的劳动力市场不完善。由于资本在地区间流动，对地区就业产生影响，因此政府必须考虑财政变量对资本和劳动的影响，选择对这种移动的资本的支出水平和税率。因此，政府可能会在移动的资本税率或公共支出方面玩这些游戏。缺席的资本所有权和就业的外部性的存在/不存在是两个不同的纳什均衡，一个发生在税收竞争和其他支出竞争的特点的重要因素。与现有文献相反，由于就业外部性，税收竞争下的税率可能低于支出竞争下的税率。在某些情况下，政府更愿意选择政府支出而不是税率作为其战略变量。就业外部性的存在促使政府利用这种支出作为变量，通过这种支出可以加强战略效果。
This study examines two different fiscal competition games under labor market imperfections. Given that capital moves across regions and affects regional employment, governments must choose the expenditure level and tax rate on such mobile capital by accounting for the effects of fiscal variables on both capital and labor. Therefore, governments may play these games with either the tax rates on mobile capital or with public expenditures. The presence/absence of absentee ownership of capital and employment externalities are significant factors that characterize two distinct Nash equilibria, one that occurs with tax competition and the other with expenditure competition. Contrary to the existing literature, tax rates under tax competition are likely to be lower than those under expenditure competition owing to employment externalities. In some cases, governments prefer to choose government expenditure as their strategic variable rather than the tax rate. The presence of employment externalities motivates governments to use such expenditure as the variable through which it may strengthen strategic effects.