Bargaining Through Agents: An Experimental Study of Delegation and Commitment
Bargaining Through Agents: An Experimental Study of Delegation and Commitment
复制标题
通过代理人讨价还价：委托与承诺的实验研究
DOI：
10.1006/game.1999.0728
复制
发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Blaine Snyder
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Schotter;Wei Zheng;Blaine Snyder
虽然面对面的讨价还价在实验室中被证明是非常有效的，但在真实的世界中，它似乎经常失败。我们认为，这种差异的原因在于，在真实的世界中，面对面的讨价还价通常不是在委托人之间进行的，而是在委托人的代理人之间进行的。我们发现，通过代理人，而不是通过委托人进行讨价还价时，无效率大幅增加，并提供了一个解释，这种无效率的上升。因此，本文有助于阐明越来越多的文献授权，承诺和偏好扭曲游戏。经济文献分类号：C78、C92。
Abstract While face-to-face bargaining has proven itself to be extremely efficient in the laboratory, it appears to break down often in the real world. This discrepancy, we assert, is explained by the fact that in the real world face-to-face bargaining is usually conducted not between principals but between the agents of principals. We find a substantial increase in inefficiency when bargaining is conducted through agents rather than through principals and offer an explanation for this rise in inefficiency. As such, this paper helps to shed light on the growing literature on delegation, commitment, and preference distortion games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, C92.