SoftME: A Software-Based Memory Protection Approach for TEE System to Resist Physical Attacks
SoftME: A Software-Based Memory Protection Approach for TEE System to Resist Physical Attacks
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SoftME：一种基于软件的TEE系统内存保护方法，抵御物理攻击
DOI：
10.1155/2019/8690853
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Guan Yong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zhang Meiyu;Zhang Qianying;Zhao Shijun;Shi Zhiping;Guan Yong
物联网的发展使得嵌入式设备得到了广泛的应用。嵌入式设备通常用于处理敏感数据，使其成为攻击者的目标。ARM TrustZone技术用于保护嵌入式设备数据免受操作系统和应用程序的攻击。但是随着嵌入式设备中存储的数据价值的增加，越来越多有效的物理攻击也出现了。但是，TrustZone无法抵抗物理攻击。我们提出SoftME，一种方法，利用片上存储器空间提供一个可信的执行环境，敏感的应用程序。我们保护存储在片外存储器上的数据的机密性和完整性。另外，在加密过程中设计了任务调度机制。我们实现了一个原型系统，我们的方法在开发板上支持TrustZone和评估我们的方法的开销。实验结果表明，该方法提高了系统的安全性，并没有显着增加系统开销。
The development of the Internet of Things has made embedded devices widely used. Embedded devices are often used to process sensitive data, making them the target of attackers. ARM TrustZone technology is used to protect embedded device data from compromised operating systems and applications. But as the value of the data stored in embedded devices increases, more and more effective physical attacks have emerged. However, TrustZone cannot resist physical attacks. We propose SoftME, an approach that utilizes the on-chip memory space to provide a trusted execution environment for sensitive applications. We protect the confidentiality and integrity of the data stored on the off-chip memory. In addition, we design task scheduling in the encryption process. We implement a prototype system of our approach on the development board supporting TrustZone and evaluate the overhead of our approach. The experimental results show that our approach improves the security of the system, and there is no significant increase in system overhead.