Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns
Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.697501
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发表时间：
2007-08
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ronald W. Masulis;Cong Wang;Feixue Xie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ronald W. Masulis;Cong Wang;Feixue Xie
我们研究了公司治理机制，特别是公司控制权市场，是否会影响公司收购的盈利能力。我们发现，反收购条款较多的收购方在公告期的异常股票收益显著较低。这支持了一种假设，即在受到更多反收购条款保护的公司中，经理们较少受到市场对公司控制权的纪律力量的约束，因此更有可能沉迷于破坏股东价值的帝国式收购。我们还发现，在竞争更激烈的行业中运营或将CEO和董事长职位分开的收购方会获得更高的异常公告回报。
We examine whether corporate governance mechanisms, especially the market for corporate control, affect the profitability of firm acquisitions. We find that acquirers with more antitakeover provisions experience significantly lower announcement‐period abnormal stock returns. This supports the hypothesis that managers at firms protected by more antitakeover provisions are less subject to the disciplinary power of the market for corporate control and thus are more likely to indulge in empire‐building acquisitions that destroy shareholder value. We also find that acquirers operating in more competitive industries or separating the positions of CEO and chairman of the board experience higher abnormal announcement returns.