Collusion among many firms: The disciplinary power of targeted punishment
Collusion among many firms: The disciplinary power of targeted punishment
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jebo.2015.03.018
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发表时间：
2015-08
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
C. Roux;C. Thöni
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Roux;C. Thöni
我们探索有针对性的惩罚，以此作为许多公司之间串通的解释。我们进行了一系列古诺寡头垄断实验，是否有可能针对特定的市场参与者进行惩罚。在有两家、四家、六家和八家公司的市场中，我们分析了定向惩罚在多大程度上有助于公司限制产量。我们发现，有针对性的惩罚会导致所有市场出现更多串通。此外，除了两家公司之外，这种串通效应在竞争对手更多的市场上甚至更强，这表明传统观念的逆转，即公司越少，串通就越容易。
We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. We run a series of Cournot oligopoly experiments with and without the possibility of targeting punishment at specific market participants. In markets with two, four, six, and eight firms, we analyze to what extent targeted punishment helps firms to restrict output. We find that targeted punishment leads to more collusion across all markets. Furthermore, beyond two firms, this collusive effect turns out to be even stronger in markets with more competitors, suggesting a reversal of the conventional wisdom that collusion is easier with fewer firms.