Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
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DOI：
10.1016/j.tpb.2010.03.002
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发表时间：
2010-06-01
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Ihara, Yasuo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kurokawa, Shun;Wakano, Joe Yuichiro;Ihara, Yasuo
合作的进化一直是进化生物学中的一个重大挑战。无条件的合作者以牺牲自己为代价帮助他人，却被享受利益却得不到任何回报的背叛者所利用。有人认为，如果合作者通过阻止未来的合作来惩罚背叛者，那么在重复的二元互动中可以建立合作。然而，在涉及两个以上个体的社会交往中，拒绝未来的合作可能导致不仅惩罚背叛者，而且惩罚其他合作者。因此，在这样的社会互动中，当合作者不能容忍任何背叛者时，合作是否最有可能发展是不清楚的。在这里，我们表明，通过分析一个随机模型的n-玩家的囚徒困境，合作的演变更有可能当合作者容忍一些叛逃时，他们没有这样的慷慨。我们还指定了最有可能促进合作发展的慷慨的最佳水平。(C)2010年爱思唯尔公司All rights reserved.
The evolution of cooperation has been a major challenge in evolutionary biology. Unconditional cooperators who help others at a cost to themselves are exploited by defectors who enjoy the benefits without any help in return. It has been argued that cooperation can be established in repeated dyadic interactions if cooperators punish defectors by withholding future cooperation. In social interactions involving more than two individuals, however, withholding future cooperation may result in penalizing not only defectors but also other cooperators. Hence, in such social interactions, it is unclear whether cooperation is most likely to evolve when cooperators are intolerant of any defectors. Here we show, by analyzing a stochastic model of n-player Prisoner's Dilemma, that the evolution of cooperation can be more likely when cooperators tolerate some defection than when they have no such generosity. We also specify the optimal level of generosity that most likely facilitates the evolution of cooperation. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.