AUDIT STATE DEPENDENT TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
AUDIT STATE DEPENDENT TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
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审计国家纳税人合规性：来自哥伦比亚的理论和证据
DOI：
10.1111/ecin.12864
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
Sadiraj, Vjollca
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Alm, James;Cox, James C.;Sadiraj, Vjollca
我们开发和分析了一个动态模型的个人纳税人的合规性选择，预测“审计国家依赖纳税人的合规性，”通过区分前瞻性与近视与天真的行为。然后，我们通过报告在哥伦比亚进行的第一次税收遵从实验的结果，实验测试审计状态依赖模型。我们发现，受试者的遵守率随着执法力度的加大而增加。我们还发现了更多新颖的结果：在审计后，罚款率应该增加，“轻推”近视的个人报告一个恒定的，而不是波动的收入比例将有利于纳税人和税务机关。（JELH26，C91）
We develop and analyze a dynamic model of individual taxpayer compliance choice that predicts “audit state dependent taxpayer compliance,” by distinguishing between forward‐looking versus myopic versus naïve behavior. We then test experimentally the audit state dependent model by reporting the results from the first tax compliance experiment run in Colombia. We find that subjects' compliance rates increase with greater enforcement. We also find more novel results: fine rates should be increased after an audit, and “nudging” myopic individuals toward reporting a constant rather than a fluctuating proportion of income would benefit both the taxpayer and the tax authority.(JELH26, C91)