Internal state recovery of Grain v1 employing guess-and-determine attack
Internal state recovery of Grain v1 employing guess-and-determine attack
复制标题
采用猜测和确定攻击的 Grain v1 的内部状态恢复
DOI：
10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0232
复制
发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Wen-Feng Qi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zhen Ma;Tian Tian;Wen-Feng Qi
著名的流密码Grain v1是欧洲eSTREAM项目的决赛选手之一。在这项研究中，一种新的猜测和确定攻击的粮食v1。该攻击主要采用了一种新的条件BSW采样技术，其主要创新思想是不仅对状态位设置条件，而且对BSW采样技术的寄存器更新也设置条件。结果表明，使用这种技术，我们可以进一步将Grain v1的采样电阻降低到2 − 29，这是迄今为止最好的结果。该攻击导致一个有效的内部状态恢复的粮食v1只有2 52在线时间采用的内存为2 79，需要2 37个密钥流的长度为2 44和2 79预处理时间。结果表明，这些数字是明显优于以前的结果。这也是第一次尝试在猜测和确定攻击中控制Grain v1的寄存器更新，希望这为此类紧凑流密码的密码分析提供新的见解。
The well-known stream cipher Grain v1 is one of the finalists of European eSTREAM project. In this study, a novel guess-and-determine attack on Grain v1 is introduced. The attack primarily employs a new conditional BSW sampling technique and the main creative idea is that the conditions are set not only on state bits but also on the updates of the registers for the BSW sampling technique. It is shown that using this technique we can further reduce the sampling resistance of Grain v1 to 2 − 29 which is the best result so far. The attack leads to an efficient internal state recovery of Grain v1 with only 2 52 online time employing a memory of 2 79 , requiring 2 37 keystreams each of length 2 44 and 2 79 preprocessing time. It is shown that these figures are obviously better compared with the previous results. This is also the first attempt to control the updates of the registers of Grain v1 in the guess-and-determine attack and hopefully this provides new insights for cryptanalysis on such compact stream ciphers.