First Choice-Maximizing School Choice Mechanisms
First Choice-Maximizing School Choice Mechanisms
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第一选择——最大化择校机制
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Sven Seuken
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Timo Mennle;Sven Seuken
我们研究了第一选择最大化(FCM)(即，学生的最大份额与他们报告的第一选择相匹配)，这是学校选择机制设计中的一种常见愿望。没有一种FCM机制是稳定的；然而，我们发现第一选择稳定性(FCS)(即没有学生与她的第一选择形成阻塞对)是与FCM相容的最强的基于等级的稳定性松弛。针对这类FCM和FCS机制，我们证明了Pareto有效成员构成了一个最小可操纵性子集(包括Boston机制)。此外，我们确定了当所有学生都采取策略性行动(推广(Ergin和Sönmez，2006年))和当一些学生真实地报告(部分推广(Pathak和Sönmez，2008年))时，这一班级中任何机制的纳什均衡结果。我们的研究结果提出了一种设计择校机制的新方法，即策略性学生在第一步自我选择接受他们所在的学校，这样诚实的学生就可以独立于通常的激励约束进行匹配。
We investigate first choice-maximality (FCM) (i.e., a maximal share of students is matched to their reported first choices), a common desideratum in the design of school choice mechanisms. No FCM mechanism can be stable; however, we find first choice-stability (FCS) (i.e., no student forms a blocking pair with her first choice) to be the strongest rank-based relaxation of stability that is compatible with FCM. Focusing on the class of FCM and FCS mechanisms, we show that the Pareto efficient members form a minimally manipulable subset (including the Boston mechanism). Moreover, we identify the Nash equilibrium outcomes of any mechanism in this class when all students act strategically (generalizing (Ergin and Sönmez, 2006)) and when some student report truthfully (in part generalizing (Pathak and Sönmez, 2008)). Our results suggest a novel approach to the design of school choice mechanisms where strategic students self-select into receiving their school in a first step, so that the matching of truthful students can be made independently of the usual incentive constraints.
剑桥:剑桥大学出版社
DOI：
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发表时间：
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期刊：
影响因子：
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作者：
Shirai;Y.. Aspect. In P. C. Hogan (Ed.)
通讯作者：
Y.. Aspect. In P. C. Hogan (Ed.)