Bargaining and distribution in marriage
Bargaining and distribution in marriage
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DOI：
10.1257/jep.10.4.139
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发表时间：
1996-09-01
影响因子：
8.4
通讯作者：
Pollak, RA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lundberg, S;Pollak, RA
家庭的标准经济模型是一个“共同偏好”模型，该模型假设家庭最大化单个效用函数，并意味着家庭行为与个人获得收入或控制资源无关。近年来，这一模式受到了婚姻博弈论模型的挑战，这些模型没有强加“汇集”，因此与经验证据一致，即丈夫和妻子控制的收入对家庭行为有不同的影响。在本文中，作者回顾了一些简单的讨价还价模型和相关的经验证据，并讨论了他们的婚姻内分配的影响。
The standard economic model of the family is a 'common preference' model that assumes that a family maximizes a single utility function and implies that family behavior is independent of which individuals receive income or control resources. In recent years, this model has been challenged by game-theoretic models of marriage that do not impose 'pooling' and are, therefore, consistent with empirical evidence that income controlled by husbands and wives does have different effects on family behavior. In this paper, the authors review a number of simple bargaining models and relevant empirical evidence, and discuss their implications for distribution within marriage.