Quantitative genetics: a critique.
Quantitative genetics: a critique.
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数量遗传学：批评。
DOI：
10.1080/19485565.1979.9988371
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发表时间：
1979
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Murphy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Murphy
迄今为止，人类遗传学的定量方面一直局限于(1)孟德尔质量分类，这是枚举的，最适用于单位点条件；(2)高尔顿分析，这是对量的一阶矩和二阶矩的检验，最适用于多轨迹条件。后一种分析没有阐明基因型的细节或它们如何塑造表型；即使作为一种描述手段，它也只有在满足狭义限制性假设（相等性、可加性和分量贡献的独立性）的情况下才足够。这种一般模型作为近似描述符的效用，只要它们经过明确的经验调查的锤炼，就可以用熟悉的类比来说明。本文讨论了几个例子，其中孟德尔分析和高尔顿分析都不合适。许多机制甚至不满足单调性的假设。简要讨论了传统意义上的遗传力
Abstract The quantitative aspects of human genetics have hitherto been confined to (1) Mendelian categorization of qualities, which is enumerative and best applied to single‐locus conditions; and (2) Galtonian analysis, which is an examination of the first and second moments of quantities and best applied to multiple‐locus conditions. The latter analysis throws no light on the details of the genotype or how they shape the phenotype; and even as a descriptive device it is adequate only where narrowly restrictive assumptions (equality, additivity, and independence of the component contributions) are met. The utility of such general models as approximate describers, provided that they are tempered by explicit empirical inquiry, is illustrated by familiar analogies. Several examples are discussed where neither Mendelian nor Galtonian analysis is appropriate. Many mechanisms do not even fulfill the assumption of monotonicity. Heritability in the conventional sense is briefly discussed