Second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishment
Second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishment
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DOI：
10.1103/physrevx.7.041027
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发表时间：
2017-10
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Szolnoki;M. Perc
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Szolnoki;M. Perc
经济实验表明，惩罚可以随着时间的推移增加公共产品游戏的贡献。然而，惩罚的有效性受到二阶搭便车和反社会惩罚的挑战。后者意味着不合作者惩罚合作者，而前者意味着不愿意承担惩罚的成本。在这里，我们扩展了空间公共产品博弈中的合作理论，考虑四种竞争策略，这是传统的合作者和背叛者，以及合作者惩罚背叛者和背叛者惩罚合作者。我们发现，如果协同效应足够高，以维持基于网络互惠的合作，反社会的惩罚不会阻止公共合作。相反，如果协同效应很低，并且需要惩罚来维持合作，反社会惩罚确实有害，但前提是成本与罚款的比率很低。如果成本相对较高，则由于空间格局的形成，合作再次占主导地位。与直觉相反的是，不惩罚合作者的背叛者，实际上是反社会惩罚的二阶搭便车者，他们在惩罚合作者周围形成了一个活跃的层，保护他们免受惩罚合作者的背叛者的伤害。一个稳定的三策略阶段，是由循环优势的自发出现，也可能通过相同的路线。报道的进化结果背后的微观机制可以解释的入侵率，确定子系统解决方案的稳定性的比较。我们的研究结果揭示了一个不太可能的进化逃避反社会惩罚的不利影响，他们提供了一个理由，为什么二阶免费搭车并不总是一个障碍的进化稳定性的惩罚。
Economic experiments have shown that punishment can increase public goods game contributions over time. However, the effectiveness of punishment is challenged by second-order freeriding and antisocial punishment. The latter implies that non-cooperators punish cooperators, while the former implies unwillingness to shoulder the cost of punishment. Here we extend the theory of cooperation in the spatial public goods game by considering four competing strategies, which are traditional cooperators and defectors, as well as cooperators who punish defectors and defectors who punish cooperators. We show that if the synergistic effects are high enough to sustain cooperation based on network reciprocity alone, antisocial punishment does not deter public cooperation. Conversely, if synergistic effects are low and punishment is actively needed to sustain cooperation, antisocial punishment does act detrimental, but only if the cost-to-fine ratio is low. If the costs are relatively high, cooperation again dominates as a result of spatial pattern formation. Counterintuitively, defectors who do not punish cooperators, and are thus effectively second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment, form an active layer around punishing cooperators, which protects them against defectors that punish cooperators. A stable three-strategy phase that is sustained by the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance is also possible via the same route. The microscopic mechanism behind the reported evolutionary outcomes can be explained by the comparison of invasion rates that determine the stability of subsystem solutions. Our results reveal an unlikely evolutionary escape from adverse effects of antisocial punishment, and they provide a rationale for why second-order freeriding is not always an impediment to the evolutionary stability of punishment.