Synthesis of Tamper-Resistant Pin-Constrained Digital Microfluidic Biochips

Synthesis of Tamper-Resistant Pin-Constrained Digital Microfluidic Biochips
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DOI:
10.1109/tcad.2018.2883901
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发表时间:
2020-01
影响因子:
2.9
通讯作者:
Jack Tang;Mohamed Ibrahim;K. Chakrabarty;R. Karri
Jack Tang;Mohamed Ibrahim;K. Chakrabarty;R. Karri
中科院分区:
计算机科学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Jack Tang;Mohamed Ibrahim;K. Chakrabarty;R. Karri

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数字微流控生物芯片(DMFBs)是一种通过操纵离散液滴来实现生物检测的新兴技术。最近的结果表明,DMFBs很容易受到致动篡改攻击,恶意攻击者修改控制信号的目的是操纵结果或造成拒绝服务。这类攻击利用了DMFBs高度可编程的特性。然而,实用的DMFBs通常使用一种称为管脚映射的技术来减少控制管脚数量,同时减少可用于液滴操作的自由度。尝试控制特定电极作为攻击的一部分,不能在不无意地激活芯片上的其他电极的情况下进行,这使得篡改变得明显。本文对引脚映射的这种防篡改特性进行了详细的研究。我们推导了相关的安全度量,评估了现有几种管脚映射算法的抗篡改性能,并提出了一种新的安全感知管脚映射器。此外,我们开发了基于整数线性规划的方法,将指示剂液滴插入DMFB中,以提高抗篡改能力。实验结果表明,所提出的技术可以显著增加攻击者对生物检测的执行进行隐蔽更改的难度。
Digital microfluidic biochips (DMFBs) are an emerging technology that implements bioassays through manipulation of discrete fluid droplets. Recent results have shown that DMFBs are vulnerable to actuation tampering attacks, where a malicious adversary modifies control signals for the purposes of manipulating results or causing denial-of-service. Such attacks leverage the highly programmable nature of DMFBs. However, practical DMFBs often employ a technique called pin mapping to reduce control pin count while simultaneously reducing the degrees of freedom available for droplet manipulation. Attempts to control specific electrodes as part of an attack cannot be made without inadvertently actuating other electrodes on-chip, which makes the tampering evident. This paper explores this tamper resistance property of pin mapping in detail. We derive relevant security metrics, evaluate the tamper resistance of several existing pin mapping algorithms, and propose a new security-aware pin mapper. Further, we develop integer linear programming-based methodologies for inserting indicator droplets into a DMFB in order to boost tamper resistance. Experimental results show that the proposed techniques can significantly increase the difficulty for an attacker to make stealthy changes to the execution of a bioassay.