Effective environmental protection in the context of government decentralization
Effective environmental protection in the context of government decentralization
复制标题
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1600451
复制
发表时间：
2010-04
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Zhongxiang Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zhongxiang Zhang
由于过去30年的经济改革，中国将资源控制权和决策权转移到了地方政府和企业。这种将决策权下放到地方和企业的做法，将环境管理交到了地方官员和污染企业手中，他们更关心经济增长和利润，而不是环境。因此，有效的环境保护需要他们的充分合作。在此背景下，本文讨论了中国领导下的中央政府在激励地方政府方面采取的各种策略，以及一些市场化工具，如配套经济政策、环境绩效评级和披露以及与金融机构的合作，以促进企业节能和环境绩效的长效提高。结论是，显然有必要仔细审视导致地方官员在环境方面缺乏合作的主客观因素，并提出了一些适当的激励措施来获得他们的合作。
China has shifted control over resources and decision making to local governments and enterprises as the result of the economic reforms over the past three decades. This devolution of decision-making to local levels and enterprises has placed environmental stewardship in the hands of local officials and polluting enterprises who are more concerned with economic growth and profits than the environment. Therefore, effective environmental protection needs their full cooperation. Against this background, this paper discusses a variety of tactics that China’s central government has been using to incentivize local governments, and a number of market-based instruments, supporting economic policies, environmental performance ratings and disclosure and cooperation with financial institutions to promote long-lasting, improved corporate energy-saving and environmental performance. It concludes that there is a clear need to carefully examine those objective and subjective factors that lead to the lack of local official’s cooperation on the environment, and provides some suggestions for appropriated incentives to get their cooperation.