Prime (Information) Brokerage

Prime (Information) Brokerage
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主要(信息)经纪

DOI:
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发表时间:
2019
影响因子:
8.9
通讯作者:
Yuehua Tang
Yuehua Tang
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Nitish Kumar;Kevin Mullally;S. Ray;Yuehua Tang

文献摘要

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我们表明,对冲基金从其主要经纪银行获得了关于银行公司借款人的信息优势。相关对冲基金在贷款公告发布之前,对借贷公司的股票进行了异常大规模的交易,这些交易的表现优于其他交易。对冲基金的交易表现尤其出色,因为它们对大宗经纪银行具有较高的收入潜力。这些知情交易似乎不仅基于贷款本身的信息,还基于公司的基本面,如未来盈利。最后,我们发现有证据表明,银行内部的股票分析师是信息传递的一个潜在渠道。
We show that hedge funds gain an information advantage from their prime broker banks regarding the banks’ corporate borrowers. The connected hedge funds make abnormally large trades in the stocks of borrowing firms prior to loan announcements, and these trades outperform other trades. The outperformance is particularly strong for trades of hedge funds that have high revenue potential for prime broker banks. These informed trades appear to be based on information not just about the loan itself but also about firms’ fundamentals such as future earnings. Finally, we find evidence suggesting that equity analysts inside the banks are one potential conduit of information transfer.