Ecosystem Externalities in Fisheries
Ecosystem Externalities in Fisheries
复制标题
渔业生态系统外部性
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Guillermo E. Herrera
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Richard W. Ryan;D. Holland;Guillermo E. Herrera
摘要渔业经济学文献主要集中在存量外部性上，在较小程度上集中在拥挤外部性上。然而，对许多渔业来说，捕捞活动可能影响饲料或生境的数量或质量，从而影响鱼类种群的基本生物生产力。我们称之为“生态系统外部性”。生态系统的外部性可能是积极的，也可能是消极的。虽然捕鱼可能以降低生产力的方式破坏生境，但在某些情况下，它可能增加食物供应，从而提高渔业目标物种的生产力。扩展Smith（1968）的模型，我们使用三个方程来描述资源存量、利润最大化个体行为和船舶进出的动态。我们用这个简单的模型来说明生态系统的外部性，与股票的外部性和拥挤的外部性，影响系统动态，开放获取的均衡，并通过税收实施的最佳渔业监管。JEL代码：Q22，Q57.
ABSTRACT The economics literature on fisheries has focused primarily on stock externalities and, to a lesser degree, on crowding externalities. Yet for many fisheries, harvesting activities may affect the underlying biological productivity of the fish stock by impacting the forage or habitat quantity or quality. We refer to this as an “ecosystem externality.” Ecosystem externalities may be positive as well as negative. While fishing may damage habitat in ways that reduce productivity, in some cases it may increase food availability and thereby increase productivity of the target species of a fishery. Extending the model of Smith (1968), we use three equations to characterize dynamics of a resource stock, profit-maximizing individual behavior, and vessel entry/exit. We use this simple model to show how ecosystem externalities, in conjunction with stock externalities and crowding externalities, affect system dynamics, open-access equilibria, and optimal fishery regulation implemented through a tax. JEL Code: Q22, Q57.