Autonomy's Substance
Autonomy's Substance
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自治的实质
DOI：
10.1111/japp.12133
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Freyenhagen F
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Freyenhagen F
在本文中，我认为必须对自治进行实质性构思，才能作为获得全套个人自由权利的资格条件。我表明，内容中立和实质性的自治解释之间的常见区别充满了混乱和模糊性，并提供了一个明确的替代分类法。至少就我们所关心的自由主义环境而言，真正的问题是自主性解释所隐含的价值和规范是否为理性的人所接受，而不是这些解释是否内容中立、程序性或以投入为中心。最后，我将展示实质性约束如何与（罗尔斯）政治自由主义中发挥作用的自治概念兼容，甚至隐含在其中。总的来说，我借鉴了英格兰和威尔士的判例法和法规，对自由主义进行了规范性的重建、澄清和内部批判。
In this article, I argue that autonomy has to be conceived substantively in order to serve as the qualifying condition for receiving the full set of individual liberal rights. I show that the common distinction between content‐neutral and substantive accounts of autonomy is riddled with confusion and ambiguities, and provide a clear alternative taxonomy. At least insofar as we are concerned with liberal settings, the real question is whether or not the value(s) and norm(s) implied by an account of autonomy are acceptable to reasonable people, not whether these accounts are content‐neutral, procedural or input‐focused. Finally, I demonstrate how substantive constraints are compatible with, or even implied in, the notion of autonomy at play in (Rawls's) political liberalism. Overall, I present a normative reconstruction, clarification, and internal critique of liberalism, drawing on case law and statutes from England and Wales.