A simple computational model for nonmonotonic and adversarial legal reasoning

A simple computational model for nonmonotonic and adversarial legal reasoning
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非单调和对抗性法律推理的简单计算模型

DOI:
10.1145/158976.159001
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发表时间:
1993
期刊:
影响因子:
56.9
通讯作者:
G. Sartor
G. Sartor
中科院分区:
综合性期刊1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
G. Sartor

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在许多常识性的上下文中,只有不连贯和相互矛盾的信息可用。在这种情况下,合理的结论必须从不一致的前提中得出。在法律的推理中尤其如此:法律的规范可以由不同的当局在不同的时间颁布,以达到不相容的社会政治目标,而这些规范的含义在语义上可能是不确定的。 单靠逻辑演绎不足以从不一致的法律的前提中推导出合理的结论,因为在最流行的逻辑系统(如古典逻辑或直觉主义逻辑)中,一切都可以从任何矛盾中推导出来。尽管如此,现在正在进行的许多研究表明,形式化的方法可以开发的推理与冲突的信息。当在一个不一致的前提集合上定义一个排序时,从该集合中获得合理结论的可能性会增加,因为前提的排序可以转化为竞争论点的排序。这一事实与法律的推理特别相关,因为律师通过使用排序关系有效地解决了规范冲突。 在接下来的页面中,提出了一个用于推理的模型,该模型被解释为单向推理规则:引入了一种用于表示(可能)矛盾规则的语言,定义了参数的概念,并区分了参数的类型。一个简单的解释器在Prolog能够开发这些参数也说明了。最后,所提出的模型(更一般地说,接受不一致)的正式分析的法律的系统的意义进行了讨论。
In many commonsense contexts only incoherent and conflicting information is available. In such contexts reasonable conclusions must be derived from inconsistent sets of premises. This is especially the case in legal reasoning: legal norms can be issued by different authorities, in different times, to reach incompatible socio-political objectives, and the meaning of those norms can be semantically indeterminate. Logic deduction alone is insufficient to derive justified conclusions out of inconsistent legal premises, since in the most popular logical systems (such as classical or intuitionistic logic) everything can be deduced from any contradiction. Nevertheless, much research now underway shows that formal methods can be developed for reasoning with conflicting information. The possibility of obtaining justified conclusions from an inconsistent set of premises increases when an ordering is defined over that set, since the ordering of the premises can be translated into an ordering of the competing arguments. This fact is particularly relevant for legal reasoning, since lawyers effectively solve normative conflicts by using ordering relations. In the following page, a model for reasoning with ordered defaults, interpreted as unidirectional inference rules, is proposed: a language for representing (possibly) contradictory rules is introduced, a notion of argument is defined, and types of arguments are distinguished. A simple interpreter in Prolog able to develop those arguments is also illustrated. Finally, the significance of the proposed model (and, more generally, of the acceptance of inconsistency) for the formal analysis of legal systems is discussed.