The self and recollection reconsidered: How a 'failure to replicate' failed and why trace strength accounts of recollection are untenable
The self and recollection reconsidered: How a 'failure to replicate' failed and why trace strength accounts of recollection are untenable
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DOI：
10.1002/acp.740
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发表时间：
2001-11-01
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Sapute, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Conway, MA;Dewhurst, SA;Sapute, A
Hirshman 和 Lanning（1999）“未能复制”Conway 和 Dewhurst（1995）报告的发现。然而，两组实验之间的设计存在重大差异。例如，赫什曼和兰宁使用受试者内设计和较短的保留间隔，而康威和杜赫斯特使用受试者间设计和较长的保留间隔。我们在一系列新的实验中证明，当使用正确的设计时，康威和杜赫斯特的发现确实可以重复，此外，我们还表明，赫什曼和兰宁实验中的设计差异解释了他们的发现。最后，我们根据自我提出了一种解释，可以解释发现的复杂模式，这种模式超出了简单的记忆痕迹强度模型的范围。版权所有 (C) 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Hirshman and Lanning (1999) 'failed to replicate' findings reported by Conway and Dewhurst (1995). There were, however, critical differences in design between the two sets of experiments. For example, Hirshman and Lanning used a within-subject design and a short retention interval, whereas Conway and Dewhurst used a between-subjects design and longer retention intervals. We demonstrate in a new series of experiments that the Conway and Dewhurst findings do replicate when the correct design is used and, moreover, we show that the design differences in Hirshman and Lanning's experiments account for their findings. Finally, we develop an account in terms of the self that can explain the complex pattern of findings, a pattern which lies beyound the scope of simple trace strength models of memory. Copyright (C) 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.