How Do Managerial Incentives Affect the Maturity Structure of Corporate Public Debt
How Do Managerial Incentives Affect the Maturity Structure of Corporate Public Debt
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DOI：
10.1016/j.pacfin.2016.10.002
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发表时间：
2016-01
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Takanori Tanaka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Takanori Tanaka
本文以日本新发行的企业债券为样本，考察了管理层持股与企业公债期限结构的关系。管理层持股比例较高的公司发行期限较短的债券。此外，管理层持股比例较高的公司信用评级较低，收益率利差较高。最后，具有较高管理层持股的公司表现出较高的公司绩效，并表现出对风险承担活动的偏好。总的来说，我的研究结果支持这样的观点，即债券持有人关心的财富转移从债券持有人到股东通过冒险活动，并要求公司与较高的管理层所有权，以发行较短的期限债券。
I examine the relation between managerial ownership and the maturity structure of corporate public debt by using a sample of newly issued Japanese corporate bonds. Firms with higher managerial ownership issue shorter maturity bonds. In addition, firms with higher managerial ownership have lower credit ratings and experience higher yield spreads. Finally, firms with higher managerial ownership exhibit higher firm performance and show a preference for risk-taking activities. Overall, my findings support the view that bondholders are concerned about wealth transfers from bondholders to shareholders through risk-taking activities and require firms with higher managerial ownership to issue shorter maturity bonds.