Some reflections on the political economy of monetary policy
Some reflections on the political economy of monetary policy
复制标题
对货币政策政治经济学的若干思考
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Haan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Haan
在过去的几十年里，许多国家的中央银行的独立性有所提高。然而，即使是一个独立的中央银行也不是在政治真空中运作的。例如，政府通常会任命政治盟友，假设央行会因此遵循符合政府偏好的政策。本文的第一部分回顾了最近关于政府的政治意识形态是否对货币政策有任何影响的研究。有人认为，如果前瞻性数据被用来估计泰勒规则模型的一个小组的经合组织国家，考虑到国家异质性，有没有强有力的证据表明，党派对货币政策的影响。中央银行的独立性不再被视为理所当然的原因之一是货币政策的再分配效应。本文的第二部分回顾了最近关于传统和非传统货币政策对收入和财富不平等的影响的研究。它的结论是，实证研究提供了非常复杂的证据，这些问题，它是没有很好地连接到最近的理论工作。
: During the past decades, central bank independence has been increased in a large number of countries. However, even an independent central bank does not operate in a political vacuum. For instance, governments generally appoint political allies, presuming that consequently the central bank will follow policies that are in line with the governments ’ preferences. The first part of this paper reviews recent research on whether the political ideology of the government has any impact on monetary policies pursued. It is argued that if forward-looking data are used to estimate Taylor-rule models for a panel of OECD countries that take country heterogeneity into account, there is no strong evidence for partisan effects on monetary policy. One of the reasons that central bank independence is no longer taken for granted is the acclaimed redistributive effects of monetary policy. The second part of the paper reviews recent research on the impact of conventional and unconventional monetary policy on income and wealth inequality. It is concluded that empirical research provides very mixed evidence on these issues and that it is not well connected to recent theoretical work.