Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia
Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia
复制标题
机构与投资者：东南亚经济危机的政治
DOI：
10.1162/002081801551423
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发表时间：
2001
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
Andrew J. Macintyre
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Andrew J. Macintyre
我对1997-98年亚洲经济危机的政治进行了系统的论证。我关注的是制度--具体地说，就是将国家政治的制度框架、政策环境和投资联系起来。我试图解决有关可信政策承诺和政策灵活性的文献之间的紧张关系，我认为，如果其中任何一种严重供应不足，投资者与政策环境相关的风险就会迅速上升。在否决权参与者框架的基础上，我建立了一个简单的模型，即政治体系中否决权参与者的数量与投资者面临的政策风险之间的U型关系。机构对行政权力的否决权降低了投资者的政策风险，但仅在一定程度上降低了政策风险，在此之后，额外的否决权参与者会助长不受欢迎的政策僵化。我用四个案例来说明这一点：泰国、菲律宾、马来西亚和印度尼西亚，这四个主要的东南亚国家卷入了金融危机。我认为，国家政治的制度框架对政策回应和投资者反应产生了强大且可预见的影响。
I develop a systematic argument about the politics of the 1997–98 Asian economic crisis. I focus on institutions—specifically, the connection linking the institutional framework of national politics, the policy environment, and investment. I seek to resolve the tension between the literatures on credible policy commitment and policy flexibility, arguing that if either is severely undersupplied, the risk associated with the policy environment rises rapidly for investors. Building on a veto player framework, I develop a simple model of a U-shaped relationship between the number of veto players in a political system and policy risk to investors. Institutional vetoes on executive authority lower policy risk for investors but only up to a point, after which additional veto players promote unwelcome policy rigidity. I illustrate this using four cases: Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the four main Southeast Asian countries involved in the financial crisis. I argue that the institutional framework of national politics had a powerful and predictable influence on policy responses and investor reactions.