The Pricing of Relative Performance Based Incentives for Executive Compensation
The Pricing of Relative Performance Based Incentives for Executive Compensation
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DOI：
10.1111/1468-5957.00410
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发表时间：
2001-11
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
António Câmara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
António Câmara
自1995年以来，超过50%的富时100指数成份股公司向其高级管理人员发放了奖励，奖励取决于公司在特定时期内相对于基准回报的股票回报(以下称为相对业绩激励)。本文研究并推导了一类相对业绩激励的闭合解，该激励具有正收益，且除传统的或有收益外，公司的股票收益高于市场收益的某一门槛。结果表明，在实践中，当相对绩效激励(RPI)取代绝对绩效激励(API)时，英国公司倾向于(I)降低薪酬方案的成本；(Ii)承担更高风险的资本投资项目；以及(Iii)避免提供如此强大的激励来增加股东财富。版权所有布莱克韦尔出版有限公司2001年。
Since 1995, more than 50 percent of the firms in the "FTSE"-100 have granted rewards to their senior executives, the payoffs of which are contingent on the firm's stock return relative to a bench mark return over a given period (hereafter, relative performance incentives). This paper investigates and derives closed-form solutions for a class of relative performance incentives that have a positive payoff if, in addition to the traditional contingencies, the firm's stock return is higher than the market return times a threshold. Results suggest that UK firms, in practice, when relative performance incentives (RPI's) substitute absolute performance incentives (API's) tend to (i) decrease the cost of their compensation packages; (ii) undertake more risky capital-investment projects; and (iii) avoid providing so high-powered incentives to increase shareholder wealth. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001.